The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views social media apps developed by Chinese internet companies as critical components of a broader, ideological security firewall. Existing in what the CCP has dubbed the “grey zone internet,” these platforms should work to prevent the infiltration of potentially harmful foreign ideas and information into the online domestic sphere of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

The findings of this report reveal that roughly 75% of Chinese-developed apps have accordingly implemented such controls in the form of Real-Name Registration (RNR) policies. These policies, which are designed to mandate personal identifiability for all online activities, effectively sacrifice user anonymity in a coordinated effort to maintain strict government control over cyber activities. Yet, when implemented on a transnational basis, these RNR policies challenge the ability of Chinese-developed platforms to sustain overseas users and often result in effective access barriers.

Notably, the global reach of China’s cyber sovereignty is only possible because of the dependence of affected communities on Chinese social media platforms and communication tools. Users whose accounts were closed after posting on politically sensitive topics are often forced to write desperate public apologies in an attempt to regain access to the Chinese-controlled social media sphere.¹ For geographically disrupted networks (in which some members are in China, while others live abroad), Chinese social media platforms have become quasi-synonymous with digital infrastructure.² After successive bans of international alternatives that started with the likes of Facebook and YouTube in the late 2000’s, they serve as the predominant means by which transnational communication can occur.

Yet account closures such as these offer a preliminary indication that there are limits to the exploitation of identifiability for transnational influence or repression. If the danger emanating from a “hostile” user outweighs the benefits of surveilling them, the user may be excluded from the surveillance system altogether.

Chinese social media apps, which once competed with U.S.-based behemoths for downloads and for a brief moment in early 2016 even outranked them, are now waning in popularity (see Figure 1, below). As such, this report pursues the hypothesis that China’s securitization of the internet and the decline of these apps are two sides of the same coin. Which begs the question: Have China’s efforts to ensure identifiability also, by either accident or design, restricted overseas access?

In examining this core hypothesis, we address three additional queries. First, to what extent is the RNR system implemented by Chinese platforms on a global scale? Second, what are the consequences for overseas users when the RNR system cannot be complied with (either due to phone number barriers, app store barrier, or both)? And third, how do access barriers like these impact overseas online communities — and can these barriers be understood as a targeted exclusion mechanism by the CCP?

Our key findings are as follows:

1. Identifiability Requirements are Common for Overseas Users: Our research reveals roughly three-out-of-every-four Chinese-developed social media apps now enforce identifiability requirements for overseas users, representing a significant — and controllable — portion of the grey zone internet.
2. RNR Policy Enforcement Creates Barriersto Access: Our findings indicate that the enforcement of RNR policies has introduced significant access barriers for not only domestic audiences — but also for overseas users and the Chinese diaspora writ large. Indeed, our quantitative assessment of access barriers across Chinese social media apps across 58 countries reveals a widespread imposition of restrictions. In approximately 35% of tested instances, users encountered barriers preventing full access to these platforms.
3. Apps with RNR Policies Experience Decline in Downloads: Our analysis of download trends from 2015 to 2023 shows a pronounced decrease in global downloads for apps influenced by RNR-related access barriers, with an 82% drop following the enactment of China’s Cybersecurity Law in 2017. After adjustments, we estimate that 14.1 million app downloads were prevented in that period.
4. Regional Variability Exists for Access Barriers: Access barriers imposed by Chinese social media platforms are not uniformly enforced across all geographies. For example, platforms such as QQ and Weibo face relatively fewer restrictions in the Asia-Pacific region compared to the extended European region, the MENA region, and South America. This varied pattern of enforcement suggests that from the CCP’s perspective — at least for certain regions — the risks of keeping online channels open and importing “dangerous” foreign ideas outweighs the potential economic and political gains lost by limiting transnational users via RNR-related access barriers.

Given these findings, we posit there are likely strategic digital boundaries and limitations to China’s influence operations as applied via RNR policies. China’s transnational influence operations center on the protection of the domestic discourse from outside opinion and commentary that is not aligned with the CCP — and this goal may be prioritized over using social media platforms to influence global discourse or mobilize overseas communities. At root then, it appears as though China is not only reshaping online discourse rooms to its advantage — it is also drawing a new digital border between a sphere it seeks to influence and a sphere of “harmful,” non-aligned political ideas.