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背景：中国追求网络 主权带来的国际影响

最后更新于: 12 九月 2024

中共正越来越坚定地引领中国追求对国内网络空间实现无可争议的控制。这种对“网络主权”的追求 包括克服西方互联网治理原则和标准设定的做法，实现技术独立，以及利用信息技术来支持政权而非 削弱之。1然而，北京的指导思想是希望建立一个完全由党国控制的“家长式”互联网，确保网络空间 的所有方面都与其线下政策保持一致，即实现“网上网下一体化”。2

自其成立之初，中国共产党就在不同程度上展现出控制信息的野心，试图掌控在中国可以交换哪些 信息以及由谁来进行交换。3在了解到社交媒体在2009年至2014年间促成新疆地区的有组织抗议活动 后，中共领导层更加坚信，监控网络信息的流动并审查可能破坏社会及政治（即政权）稳定的内容有 着至关重要的作用。4

因此，习近平政府推行了一系列立法改革，新建立了如国家互联网信息办公室（CAC）这样的强权机 构，5并为这些机构赋予了新的意义和使命。这些措施极大地扩展了中国复杂且无所不在的监控体系， 不仅用于迫害少数民族和宗教团体，也用来压制言论自由和异见。6政治科学学者们认为，这种先进的 监视系统实现了两种广泛且迄今为止相当成功的策略：一是在政治反对派形成任何实际抵抗力量之前 将其扼杀（即预防性镇压），7二是容许甚至主动策划无实际威胁的抵抗行为（也称为“导向性数字异 议”）。8

实现如此广泛的网络控制的关键在于强制实施普遍的身份可识别性，即要求必须进行身份认证才能上网。在中国，这一要求通过各种技术和监管手段来实施，统称为实名注册政策。

从更广泛的角度来看，身份可识别性与匿名性之间存在二元对立关系，二者只能选其一，但它们在互 联网空间中都扮演着重要的角色。身份可识别性有助于培养数字公民意识，加强民主机构，并有效抗 击仇恨言论、欺诈和网络犯罪等。9另一方面，维护匿名对于保护吹哨人和处于风险中的个体至关重 要，它能赋予家暴幸存者和边缘化群体更多权利，并保护个人权利免遭严重的不公正待遇，对于生活 在如中国这样压迫性政权下的个人和群体来说尤其如此。10本报告的作者认为，只有在必要且适当的 情况下，例如在涉及仇恨言论或欺诈的情况下，才应限制匿名并通过身份验证措施来确定用户的真实 身份。11

然而，中国政府在极力强调身份可识别性的同时削弱了匿名性，采取强硬的手段推行实名制，其相关 标准远超应对仇恨言论和欺诈的范畴。实际上，对于中国的预防性镇压系统而言，身份可识别性是监 控未来抗议活动计划、压制言论以及识别参与政府抗议人士的主要手段。12例如，13自2020年起，中国 的所有网络用户都必须在社交媒体上公开其IP地址。14从2022年开始，拥有超过50万粉丝的社交媒体 账户必须在网上公开真实姓名，15这一政策显著缩小了中国的网络社群。16

正如一些相关研究一样，本报告关注中共追求网络主权所带来的国际及跨国影响。这种影响是多方面 的，为许多不同的行动者和社群带来了新的问题和挑战。中国数字经济的全球扩张不仅推动了国内工 业的现代化，17也按照中国的利益重塑了国际规范和标准。18同时，中国的互联网平台在破坏民主机 构，19进行认知战，20以及通过短视频平台和具有国际影响力的网络红人来“讲好中国故事”。21因 此，实现网络主权不仅是经济问题，也是关乎话语权的国策问题。22

身份可识别性具有跨国维度。最近的研究揭示了身份识别措施如何帮助监控和审查针对中国的更广泛 的讨论。23例如，加拿大一所高校附属的研究机构“公民实验室”（The Citizen Lab）发现，在中国 境外注册的微信用户（估计有1亿人）受到与中国国内用户相同的内容监控。24反过来，这种方式收集 的数据帮助中国在海外华人社群中开展有针对性的、个体化的信息行动。最近的研究显示，这类信息 活动利用海外华人对中国社交媒体的依赖 25 来促进海外亲北京社群的团结，26并在海外华人社群与其所 在国之间制造分裂，27特别是在美国的华人移民社群中表现尤为明显。28

令人不安的是，中国社交媒体上的用户身份认证还使得异见人士和流亡海外的少数族裔在现实世界中 29 面临恐吓和压迫。全球范围内，由中共领导的个人和机构通过被称为“统一战线”30的网络拉拢和强 迫异见人士和流亡者就范，这些做法统称为跨国镇压，已经波及全球各地，受影响的群体包括宗教团 体（如藏人和穆斯林）、香港的民主派政治家、人权律师、31学生活动家、网络红人等。32中国当局除 了执行上述手段外，其安全部门在海外设立非法的警察站，33并在海外异见人士的电子设备上部署侵 入性的间谍软件，34这三者协同作用。在中国平台上遵守实名注册要求的用户因此暴露在监控之下， 特别是在微信上，35当局利用收集到的信息去恐吓和压制这些人及其在中国的家庭成员。36

  1. It has been often argued that China’s resolve in overcoming technological dependencies stems from frustrations over global standard setting dynamics, where Western coalitions rejected technically viable standards by Chinese engineers, such as WAPI for wireless internet connections. See Michael Sutherland, “CSR 2019: Setting a New Standard: Implications of China’s Emerging Standardization Strategy,” SAISCSR; and Severine Arsène, “Global Internet Governance in Chinese Academic Literature, ”China Perspectives, 25–35 (2), 2016. In his analysis of China’s conception of cyber sovereignty, Creemers posits that the key objectives are “territorialization and indigenization [of cyber space]. With territorialization, Beijing seeks to delineate its national boundaries in cyberspace, ensure that online processes affecting important Chinese interests take place within those boundaries, and unwanted activities can be barred from entering. Indigenization, in turn, attempts to substitute foreign actors and technologies by homegrown equivalents, reducing reliance on the outside world and building a competitive digital sector.” See Rogier Creemers, “China’s Approach to Cyber Sovereignty. In Governing Cyberspace: Behavior, Power and Diplomacy,” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung,November 24, 2020; Rogier Creemers, “China’s Conception of Cyber Sovereignty: Rhetoric and Realization,” InD. Broeders & B. van den Berg (Eds.), Governing Cyberspace: Behavior, Power, and Diplomacy, 2020. ↩︎

  2. According to O’Hara and Hall, “A Paternal Internet sees the Internet as continuous with and integrated within the offline world, and asserts that Internet engineering and governance should be subordinate to centrally defined beneficial outcomes.” See Keiron O’Hara and Wendy Hall, “Four Internets: Data, Geopolitics, and the Governance of Cyberspace,” Oxford University Press, 2020, Chapter 11. ↩︎

  3. Jyh-An Lee and Ching-Yi Liu, “Real- Name Registration Rules and the Fading Digital Anonymity in China,” Washington International Law Journal, 25(1), 2016, page 3. Margaret Roberts, “Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China’s Great Firewall,” Princeton University Press, 2020, Chapter 3. ↩︎

  4. Zhuang Pinghui, “Be more positive, Chinese internet tsar Lu Wei tells celebrity weibo users,” SCMP, August 15, 2013. ↩︎

  5. The “post-centralization” period in Chinese cybersecurity governance refers to the phase following the establishment of centralized control by the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, marked by a strategic emphasis on integrating Internet governance with national security and development policies, leading to a more top-down, government-led approach. See Jinhe Liu, “Rethinking Chinese multistakeholder governance of cybersecurity,” in Ian Johnston, et al. (Ed.), “Building an International Cybersecurity Regime,” Elgar Online, 2023. ↩︎

  6. James Tager, “Forbidden Feeds: Government Controls on Social Media in China,” PEN America, March 2018. ↩︎

  7. In “The Sentinel State,” Minxin Pei provides detailed accounts of China’s structures and methods that “stymie the opposition before it can act,” including the distribution of surveillance mandates to non-traditional security entities and the targeted and continuous surveillance of between 7.3 to 12.7 million “key individuals.” See Minxin Pei, “The Sentinel State,” Harvard University Press, 2024. Margaret Roberts explains that preventive repression works through instilling fear in users, inserting friction in connectivity, and producing floods of distracting information. See Margaret Roberts, “Censored: Distraction and DiversionInside China’s Great Firewall,” Princeton University Press, 2020. ↩︎

  8. China adopts a strategy that manages and directs anger, dissidence, and dissatisfaction towards the local government in China. See Jason Gainous et al., “Directed Digital Dissidence in Autocracies: How China Wins Online,” Oxford University Press, 2023. ↩︎

  9. José van Dijck, “The Culture of Connectivity: A Critical History of Social Media,” Oxford University Press, 2013. ↩︎

  10. Per Article 19, “the protection of anonymity is a vital component in protecting both the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy.” See Article 19, “Right to Online Anonymity - Policy Brief, ”June 2015. Similarly, DeNardis discusses the consequences of abolishing online anonymity. See Laura DeNardis, “The Global Warfor Internet Governance, ” Yale University Press. 2014, page 237. McKinnon discusses anonymity in repressive regimes. See Rebecca McKinnon, “Consent the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle For Internet Freedom,” Basic Books, 2012. ↩︎

  11. Maike Gilliot, Vashek Matyas, Sven Wohlgemuth, “Privacy and Identity,” in Kai Rannenberg, Denis Royer, André Deuker (Ed.), “The Future of Identity in the Information Society,” Springer, Berlin, 2009, pages 251–390; Jyh-An Lee and Ching-Yi Liu, “Real-Name Registration Rules and the Fading Digital Anonymity in China,” Washington International Law Journal, 25(1), 2016, page 29. ↩︎

  12. Laura DeNardis, “The Global War for Internet Governance,” Yale University Press. 2014, page 237 ↩︎

  13. Another example is the blocking of securely encrypted traffic that uses TLS 1.3 and ESNI. See Catalin Cimpanu, “China is now blocking all encrypted HTTPS traffic that uses TLS 1.3 and ESNI,” ZDNet, August 8, 2020. In addition, Douyin announced more thorough verification mechanisms for “parties involved in high-profile events and suspected fabricated content.” See Global Times, “Douyin initiates verification on trending topics to combat clout-chasing behavior slacking moral integrity,” May 28, 2024. ↩︎

  14. Coco Feng, “Chinese social media to display user locations based on IP address, including platforms from ByteDance and Zhihu,” SCMP, April 17, 2022. ↩︎

  15. Zeyi Yang, “How 2023 marked the death of anonymity online in China,” MIT Technology Review, December 22, 2023; Qiao Langjun [俏郎君], “Is Front Desk Real-Name System Coming? De-anonymization on the Internet is Inevitable” [前台实名制要来了？互联网‘去匿名化’已是大势所趋], 36Kr, October 25, 2023. ↩︎

  16. Phoebe Zhang, ”Crackdown on anonymous Chinese social media accounts heightens concerns over privacy and free speech,“ SCMP, October 21, 2023. ↩︎

  17. Rebecca Arcesati et al., “China’s digital platform economy: Assessing developments towards Industry 4.0,” MERICS, May 2020. ↩︎

  18. Jonathan E. Hillman, “The Digital Silk Road: China’s Quest to Wire the World and Win the Future,” Profile Books, 2021. ↩︎

  19. Samantha Hoffman, et al., “Truth and reality with Chinese characteristics,” ASPI, May 2024; Peter Raymond, “Re-platformed Planet? Implications of the Rise and Spread of Chinese Platform Technologies,” CSIS, March 2023. ↩︎

  20. Reporters Without Borders, “Pursuit of a New World Media Order,” March 2019; Daniel Crain, “America’s Cognitive Warfare Against China,” Sinification, January 25, 2024. ↩︎

  21. Glenn Tiffert, et al., “Telling China’s Story: The Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign To Shape Global Narratives,” Hoover Institution, July 2020. ↩︎

  22. Hannah Bailey, “Discursive Statecraft: China’s Information Operations,” Council on Geostrategy, March 2023. ↩︎

  23. “WeChat users outside of China are increasingly finding themselves trapped in a mobile extension of the Great Firewall of China through which they’re subjected to surveillance, censorship and propaganda.” See Fergus Ryan, Audrey Fritz, Daria Impiombato, “TikTok and WeChat: Curating and Controlling Global Information Flows,” ASPI, September 2020. ↩︎

  24. Jeffrey Knockel, et al., “We Chat, They Watch,” May 2020, Citizen Lab. ↩︎

  25. Luwei Rose and Yi Kang, “Loyalty to WeChat beyond national borders: a perspective of media system dependency theory on techno-nationalism,” Chinese Journal of Communication, 14 (4), 2021. ↩︎

  26. Yan Xiaojun and Li La, “Propaganda beyond state borders: the deployment of symbolic resources to mobilize political support among the Chinese diaspora,” The Pacific Review, 36 (3), 2023. ↩︎

  27. Audrey Wong, “The Diaspora and China’s Foreign Influence Activities,” in Lucas Myers (Ed.), “Essays on China and U.S. Policy,” The Wilson Center, 2022. ↩︎

  28. Chia Zhang, “WeChatting American Politics: Misinformation, Polarization, & Immigrant Chinese Media,” in Wanning Sun and Haiqing Yu (Ed.), “WeChat and the Chinese Diaspora,” Routledge, 2022. ↩︎

  29. Article19, “Blog: In China, when cyber censorship fails, resort to old-fashioned intimidation,” March 12, 2024. ↩︎

  30. Alex Joske, “The Party Speaks for You,” ASPI, June 2020. ↩︎

  31. According to Freedom House (an independent human rights watchdog), China conducts the “most sophisticated, global, and comprehensive campaign of transnational repression (TNR) in the world.” China’s transnational repression is conducted by different agencies, such as the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and the People’s Liberation Army and includes assassination attempts, physical assaults, and unlawful extraditions. See Freedom House, “China: Transnational Repression Origin Country Case Study,” February, 2022. Human Rights Watch (an advocacy organization on human rights), further points to collaborative efforts with host states, such as Turkey and Egypt, who facilitate targeted and direct attacks on Uyghurs outside of the PRC. See Human Rights Watch, “Beyond Borders: China’s Transnational Repression of Uyghurs,” January 15, 2024. ↩︎

  32. Shen Lu, “Chinese Tweeter in Exile Ran One-Man News Hub on Protests,” The Wall Street Journal, December 13, 2022. ↩︎

  33. Safeguard Defenders, “Patrol and Persuade - A follow up on 110 Overseas investigation,” December 2022. ↩︎

  34. In February 2024, leaked documents revealed that state-backed hacking group i-Soon had successfully breached the digital security measures of countless devices. See Frank Bajak and Dake Kang, “An online dump of Chinese hacking documents offers a rare window into pervasive state surveillance,” February 24, 2024, AP News. ↩︎

  35. Bradley Jardine, “Great Wall of Steel: China’s Global Campaign to Suppress the Uyghurs,” The Wilson Center, 2022; David Tobin and Nyrola Elimä, “‘We know you better than you know yourself’: China’s transnational repression of the Uyghur diaspora,” University of Sheffield, 2023. ↩︎

  36. Overseas students rely on exploitable Chinese state-approved apps to communicate with their family and friends in China. The monitoring of these apps has led to threats being made to family members in mainland China. These threats include revoking their passports, getting them fired from their jobs, preventing them from receiving promotions and retirement benefits, or even restricting their physical freedom. See Amnesty International, “China: Overseas students face harassment and surveillance in campaign of transnational repression,” May 13, 2024; Dake Kang and Huizhong Wu, “Two Chinese bloggers in exile warn that police are interrogating their followers,” Associated Press, February 27, 2024. ↩︎